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Abstract
We experimentally investigate cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma situation, where
the socially e±cient outcome may be encouraged by risk aversion and/or inequality aversion.
The ¯rst part of our experiment is devoted to the elicitation of subjects' aversion pro¯le,
taking care not to confuse the two dimensions. Subjects are then grouped by three according
to their aversion pro¯les, and they interact in a repeated social dilemma game. In this game,
agents are characterised by a social status so that the higher the agent's status, the higher
her earnings. Cooperation is costly for a majority of agents at each period, but statuses can
be reversed in future periods. We show that cooperation is strongly in°uenced by the group's
aversion pro¯le. Groups averse in both dimensions cooperate more than groups averse in only
one dimension. Moreover cooperation seems to be more a®ected by risk aversion, whereas
one might interpret cooperative behaviour as an inequality averse or altruistic attitude.
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1. Introduction
In many economic situations, cooperative interactions come from the willingness of some indi-
viduals to undertake costly actions in order to achieve social objectives. For example most of the
non-pro¯t organizations would not exist without private donations, and some public goods would
not be created in the absence of voluntary contributions. Although cooperation is generally e±-
cient for society, it is e®ective only if individuals who enjoy a ¯nancially dominant position act in
this way. Social cooperation is sometimes a legal measure imposed by a social choice, collectively
approved. The main illustration concerns redistributive taxation schemes which ¯nance, among
others, health insurance and unemployment insurance national systems. The scheme structure is
usually progressive so that high incomes are taxed proportionally more. Surprisingly, a large ma-
jority of citizens recognise the bene¯cial e®ects of such redistributive policies, even if advantages
are given to a minority.
Thus the question of the motivations for social cooperation often arises. Why do some individ-
uals in an advantageous position collaborate for social objectives by a voluntary and apparently
unsel¯sh behaviour, and why do they accept or even encourage redistributive policies? Obvi-
ously there is no immediate answer because many factors, sometimes con°icting, can in°uence
decision-making and the weight of each factor depends on the context. In some cases, social
cooperation is a purely altruistic attitude. Donations to charities or research associations for ex-
ample might be placed in this category. By de¯nition altruism consists in helping someone else
without receiving bene¯ts. But in most cases, individuals do get something out of unsel¯sh acts,
which makes motivations more ambiguous. For example when an individual encourages measures
to promote equality, she can be motivated by altruism but also by a kind of risk aversion. A
simple explanation is that a reduction of inequalities in society today ensures a diminution of
potential risks in the future. First, small inequalities contribute to social cohesion, which is a
necessary condition to preserve an advantageous position. Examples of countries where social
con°icts, political instabilities and civil wars are correlated with inequalities are extremely large.
Second, social positions are not ¯xed over time, and everyone can fall into poverty or disease.
If wealth is equitably distributed in society and if health and unemployment insurance systems
are generous, we are sure that the fall will be relatively cushioned. That is, a purely egoistic
individual but risk averse and overpessimistic may take part in social programs.
Providing a better understanding of the individual's motivation in situations where risk aver-
sion and inequality aversion can stimulate cooperative behaviour is the aim of this paper. We
propose and test by an experiment a simple game which captures such a situation. In this
game each agent is characterised by a social status, which represents her capacities to obtain
high earnings: the higher the agent's status, the higher her earnings. With status as private
information, each agent has to vote for one among two possible earnings distributions, and the
majority vote applies. In the ¯rst distribution, called cooperative, earnings are more equally
distributed and total earnings are greater. But in the second one, called defective, a majority
of agents have greater personal earnings. Distributions are of common knowledge so that each
agent knows her own potential earnings, depending on her status. That is, choosing cooperative
distribution is socially e±cient but costly for a majority of people, a situation which constitutes
a social dilemma. The game is repeated a ¯nite number of periods. At the end of each period,
statuses are completely revised so that someone advantaged by her initial status can loose her
privileges, and conversely. An experiment is run to observe the cooperation in this game. Since
risk aversion and inequality aversion seem to be the more in°uential factors of cooperation, we
elicit in the ¯rst part of the experiment subject's aversion pro¯le. We take care not to confuse
the two dimensions, so that inequality is controlled when risk is elicited, and vice versa. Subjects
are then grouped by three according to their pro¯le, under a partner matching protocol, and
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they participate in a twenty periods game. Our main objective is to observe levels and evo-
lutions of cooperation, controlling aversion pro¯le of each group. Intuitively, one may suppose
that groups averse in both dimensions are more cooperative, with a reinforcement of the social
cooperation across the periods. But the outcome is a priori ambiguous for groups averse in only
one dimension, or non-averse in both of them.
This paper is organised as follows. We explicit in Section 2 the framework and our objectives,
situating our contribution in the literature. We discuss how risk and inequality aversions are
traditionally investigated and we specify what risk aversion and inequality aversion mean in our
context. Relationships between these two dimensions are then clari¯ed, and we mention some
results of empirical works devoted to the in°uence of risk and inequality perceptions on social
cooperation. We present in Section 3 our social dilemma game, which simpli¯es real economic
situations described above. The experimental design is then exposed in Section 4. The strategy
used for eliciting subjects' aversion pro¯les and the parametrization of the game are detailed.
Results are proposed in Section 5. First, we present the aversion pro¯les and we check if aversion
in one dimension is correlated with aversion in the other. Then we analyse levels and evolutions
of cooperation for each type of group, using simple descriptive statistics and a dynamic probit
model. Particular attention is paid to the ¯rst period of the game, because all periods but the
¯rst are in°uenced by the cooperation in previous periods. In the ¯rst period, a cooperative
behaviour only depends on intrinsic characteristics of the subjects. Finally, we conclude by a
discussion in Section 6.
2. Framework and related literature
Attitudes towards risk and inequality are two essential components in the { individual and collec-
tive { economic decision-making process. In the standard literature, an individual is risk-averse
if she is unwilling to accept a risky gamble: she will prefer the expected payment of the gamble
for sure to the gamble itself. Symmetrically, an individual exhibits inequality aversion when she
is unsatis¯ed, other things equal, by an unequal income distribution: in her opinion, the social
welfare will be maximised if the total income is shared equally among individuals. Literature
on risk theory is mainly focused on the modeling of individual preferences faced with risky sit-
uations, with applications in insurance and ¯nance. A large number of experimental studies
investigated attitudes to risk in such a framework, reported particularly in an extensive survey
by Harrison & RutstrÄ om (2008). The concept of inequality aversion is echoed in two distinct but
closely associated literatures. The ¯rst one comes to a large extent from the philosophical the-
ories of justice, their main purpose being the investigation of social choice issues in a normative
perspective. Inequality aversion constitutes in this context one dimension of the social planner's
ethical preferences, motivated by impartiality and fairness. Several experiments including Glesjer
et al. (1977) or more recently Amiel et al. (1999) were run to quantify this aversion precisely.
The second one is concerned with game theory, where inequality aversion is used to justify non-
self-interested behaviours. Rabin (1993), Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000)
are usually recognised as the starting-point of this literature. Nevertheless, while the concepts
of risk aversion and inequality aversion have received substantial { theoretical and empirical {
treatments, only few studies have investigated the link between these two dimensions. More
precisely, only few studies have investigated preferences in environments where individuals are
simultaneously confronted to risk and inequality.
The ¯rst paradox is that formal links between risk theory and inequality theory are well-
established. It is well-known that original contributions started in the same period with the
same theoretical framework, initiated by the papers of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970) and Atkinson
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(1970), respectively in the ¯elds of risk theory and income inequality. 1 Lotteries (risk), and
income distributions (inequality) are treated as random variables with probability densities.
Whereas a probability is, in risk theory, a chance of winning particular earnings, it represents in
inequality the proportion of individuals having one possible income. Consequently the main tool
to compare such random variables is the stochastic dominance theory where, depending on the
environment, the variability may be interpreted as risk or inequality. Aversion models consistent
with the views captured by the dominance criteria are then proposed, like the so-called expected
utility model. Again, depending on the environment, parameters of such models may capture the
individual's risk aversion degree, or her aversion to inequality. Similarities between risk theory
and inequality theory is emphasised by Rothschild & Stiglitz (1973).
The second paradox is that, as described in the introduction, it is di±cult in many economic
situations to identify which aversion is the driving force behind the decision-making process.
This observation is especially true in interaction situations where a collective decision to reduce
inequality implies for each member of the society a diminution of potential future risk (Fafchamps
2004). For example, redistribution policies are not only justi¯ed by altruism considerations, but
also by the necessity to o®er a mutual coverage system of social risks. As mentioned by Cowell
& Schokkaert (2001) and Brennan et al. (2008), most of the normative theories explicitly use the
insurance analogy to justify their principles of justice. Whereas redistributive policies are mostly
imposed on individuals, there exists a lot of economic examples where cooperation { motivated
by risk aversion and/or inequality aversion { results from a voluntary and free participation.
Mutual-bene¯t societies, which propose insurance schemes based on a solidarity principle, or
cooperative-type associations (for example agricultural or banking cooperatives) which promote
the mutual interest of their members, are good illustrations.
Several empirical results tend to corroborate the in°uence of risk aversion on individual mo-
tivations to reduce inequality. For example Schokkaert et al. (2002) proposed a questionnaire
study where Belgian respondents were asked their opinion on the unemployment insurance sys-
tem. Respondents had previously been classi¯ed according to their altruism and their subjective
perception concerning probability of becoming unemployed in the year to come, on the basis of
two simple questions. The authors observe that both the degrees of altruism and income risk
have a signi¯cant positive e®ect on the preferences for a more generous system. This in°uence is
clearly con¯rmed by Ravallion & Lokshin (2000). At the question: "Do you agree or disagree that
the government must restrict the income of the rich?", 73.6% of the 7000 Russian respondents
opted for redistribution. But responses °uctuate, depending whether respondents expect (i) to
get a better living standard in the future, (ii) to remain at the same level or (iii) to get a worse
living standard. Whereas relatively rich respondents in groups (i) and (ii) are less inclined to
choose redistribution, more than 80% of the respondents in the highest expenditure decile but
in group (iii) agree with restriction. Equivalent observations come from the behavioral game
theory. For example in the public good game, inequality aversion or altruism constitutes one
hypothesis to justify voluntary contributions (see e.g. Palfrey & Prisbey (1996) and Masclet &
Villeval (2008)). But Shogren (1987, 1990) showed that these contributions could be positively
in°uenced by an increase of the risk, associated with level at which the good is provided. Con-
sequently, the author argued that voluntary contributions can be explained by the traditional
hypothesis on sel¯sh rational behaviour in risky situations, without incorporating such notions
as altruism.
Thus a ¯rst important question arises: is an individual risk averse automatically inequal-
ity averse and vice versa? Following the traditional theories on risk and inequality, there is
no objective reason to consider that an individual averse in one dimension is not averse in the
1 These papers were moreover published in the same issue of the same journal.
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other: individual preferences models only di®er in the description of the environment. This ques-
tion has received substantial treatments, including Amiel et al. (2001), Amiel & Cowell (2002),
Bosmans & Schokkaert (2004) or Carlsson et al. (2005). In these studies systematic di®erences
between aversions are observed, which suggests that direct transpositions of the measurement
tools between risk and inequality are too simplistic. Our ¯rst objective in this paper, related to
the previous works, is to investigate possible interactions between risk aversion and inequality
aversion. Our strategy slightly di®ers since we focus on social risks, in the sense that risks are
commonly borne by society: an individual risk loving behaviour can endanger the situation of
other persons. 2 Closer to our concern is the experimental study of Brennan et al. (2008) which
analyses connections between other-regarding preferences and aversion to social risks (see also
GÄ uth et al. 2008).
In social dilemmas where cooperation, costly for a majority of agents, entails a reduction in
inequality and a decrease in social risks, one may reasonably suppose that the agent's aversion
pro¯le over risk and inequality in°uences her motivations to cooperate. Controlling this aversion
pro¯le, our second and main objective is to evaluate and distinguish the driving forces which lead
to cooperation. Subjects are grouped by homogeneous pro¯les and interact in a social dilemma
game. We note that the investigation of group composition e®ects on the cooperation is the
purpose of recent experiments. Related to our work, Teyssier (2008) showed that disadvantageous
inequity aversion and risk aversion decrease the probability of choosing competition between
workers in a performance payment scheme. In the public good game, Burlando & Guala (2005)
and GÄ achter & ThÄ oni (2005) showed that cooperation levels are signi¯catively modi¯ed if the
subjects are associated according to their cooperation pro¯les.
3. A risk/inequality social dilemma game
We ¯rst propose a simple game to capture a social dilemma situation as described above. An
agent i 2 N = f1;2;:::;ng is characterised by a social status si 2 S = f1;2;:::;sg. We assume
that there exists less social statuses than agents (s · n) in society, so that two agents can have
the same status. The vector of social statuses is denoted by s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) 2 Sn. Social
status si represents agent i's rank in the earnings ordinal scale: the higher the agent's status,
the greater her earnings. So earnings are a correspondence x : S ¡! D, where D is a non-empty
subset of R, strictly increasing in social statuses such that x(si) < x(sj) for all si < sj. Then




2 Dn. The mean earnings of
distribution x 2 Dn is de¯ned by ¹(x) =
Pn
i=1 x(si)=n.
Consider now that society is faced with two exogenous earnings distributions and has to
choose one of them. For example society has the possibility to establish a redistributive scheme
or to keep the status quo. Intuitively, two main dimensions will in°uence the choice, the mean
earnings and the degree of inequality in each distribution. We need the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 3.1 (Social Dominance) Given two distributions x;y 2 Dn, we will say that x
socially dominates y, denoted by x ºS y, if and only if ¹(x) ¸ ¹(y) and x is more equally
distributed than y. 3
2 Correlation between preferences over social risks and preferences over individual risks is evaluated by Harrison
et al. (2005). Their results suggest no signi¯cative di®erences.
3 We do not de¯ne what \more equally" means, since it requires debatable normative value judgments. For
example the Gini index might be used. In our experiment there is no ambiguity because in the more equal
distribution, all individuals have the same earnings.
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Nevertheless, a redistributive scheme is generally costly for a majority of people. In the case of
a poverty reduction policy, for example, a large majority of individuals contribute to helping a
small number of people. In the model, the proportion of agents having higher earnings in x than
in y is de¯ned by:
'(x;y) = #
©
i 2 N j x(si) ¸ y(si)
ª
=n; (1)
where # denoted the cardinality of the set. If the social choice between the two distributions is
democratic, one may argue that the value of '(x;y) will play a crucial role. We introduce the
following criterion:
De¯nition 3.2 (Majority Dominance) Given two distributions x;y 2 Dn, we will say that
x majority dominates y, denoted by x ºM y, if and only if '(x;y) ¸ 1=2.
Using de¯nitions 3.1 and 3.2, we immediately observe that a social dilemma situation emerges if
criteria lead to a contradiction:
De¯nition 3.3 (Social Dilemma) Given two distributions x;y 2 Dn, we will say that society
faces a social dilemma with socially e±cient distribution x, denoted by x B y, if and only if
x ºS y and y ºM x.
In the following, we denote by xc 2 Dn the cooperative distribution and by xd 2 Dn the
defective distribution, such that xc B xd. Each agent has to vote for one of them, with her
own social status { and consequently her potential earnings in each distribution { as private
information. The vote of agent i is indicated by vi 2 V = f0;1g, where vi = 0 represents
defecting and vi = 1 cooperating. Then the voting pro¯le is de¯ned by v = (v1;v2;:::;vn) 2 Vn.
The winning distribution is obtained by the majority rule, such that xc defeats xd if ¹(v) = Pn
i=1 vi=n ¸ 1=2. We denote by I : Vn ! f0;1g the indicator function de¯ned by:
I(v) =
½
1; if ¹(v) ¸ 1=2,
0; if ¹(v) < 1=2.
We are now in position to de¯ne the earnings of agent i in a one-shot-game:





In the one-shot-game, a Nash agent simply votes for the distribution in which her own potential
earnings are greater. If xc B xd, a majority of agents have greater earnings in the defective dis-
tribution xd. Thus the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is xd, the socially ine±cient distribution.
A graphic representation can clarify this social dilemma context (see Figure 1). To simplify
consider that s = n with n an even number, and that si = i for all i 2 N. Thus, agent 1 with
social status s1 = 1 is the poorest in this society, agent 2 with social status s2 = 2 the second
poorest, and so on until the richest agent n with social status sn = n. In the graph points ¡
si;x(si)
¢
are represented, such that all the adjacent points are joined by a straight line. By
de¯nition the curves are increasing, since earnings are increasing with social status. First, the
mean earnings are represented by the area below the curve (de°ated by n). One observes that
this area is greater for xc, so that ¹(xc) > ¹(xd). Inequality is then captured by the slope of the
curve. The slope is everywhere greater for xd, which implies that:
xc(si) ¡ xc(si¡1) · xd(si) ¡ xd(si¡1); 8 i = 2;3;:::;n: (3)
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Figure 1: Social Dilemma Illustration
This result implies that there is less inequality in xc than in xd, according to the absolute
di®erential quasi-ordering. 4 This extremely demanding inequality criterion is consistent with
all standard measures used in the literature, such as the Lorenz criterion. Thus xc ºS xd.
Finally, the intersection point of the curves is before n=2, which implies that '(xd;xc) > 1=2, or
equivalently xd ºM xc. We conclude that xc B xd.
This social dilemma, limited to one-shot, is not really interesting. A cooperative behaviour
(the choice of xc) by agents in an advantageous position corresponds to a purely altruistic atti-
tude. There exists in the literature most simple games to observe such a behaviour. Interesting
features appear in a repetition of the game, distributions xc and xd remaining ¯xed, but with
a possible revision of social statuses. In that sense, a favorable position in the social hierar-
chy { approximated by a hight social status { is not guarantee over time. For example any
worker can loose her job, and fall into poverty. Suppose that there exists a ¯nite number of




n) 2 Sn. We suppose that social statuses are completely revised at each period,
such that st+1 = ¦tst where ¦t is a random (n £ n)-permutation matrix. The voting pro¯le at
period t is denoted by vt = (vt
1;vt
2;:::;vt
n) 2 Vn. At the end of the game, agent i is characterised
by her social status pro¯le over the T periods, that is by the vector si = (s1
i;s2
i;:::;sT
i ) 2 ST.
Finally, the overall voting pro¯le is de¯ned by © = (v1;v2;:::;vT) 2 Vn£T. The overall earnings






If xc and xd remain ¯xed and xc B xd, then there exists a unique { and socially ine±cient {
subgame perfect equilibrium, easily identi¯able by backward induction: for each of the T periods,
xd defeats xc.
The strategic component in this model is the overall voting pro¯le ©, the other variables
being exogenous. Contrary to the one-shot-game, a cooperative behaviour by an agent favorably
treated through her status, is more di±cult to interpret. On the one hand, cooperation in
one period may be encouraged by inequality aversion or altruism. On the other hand, such a
4 See Moyes (1994,1999) for a formal presentation of this inequality criterion.
5 We implicitly assume that the discount rate is equal to unity.
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behaviour may be considered as a self-insurance to cover potential future di±culties, by expecting
a reciprocal behaviour. The aim of this paper is to observe experimentally levels and evolutions
of cooperation, controlling explicitly for risk aversion and inequality aversion.
4. Experimental design
The experiment was run on a computer network in autumn 2007 at LAMETA-LEEM, Univer-
sity of Montpellier, France. 108 subjects randomly drawn from a pool of 1400 volunteers were
recruited and divided into 6 sessions, with 18 subjects each. Participants were students and had
never participated in an experiment dealing with inequality or risk aversion. The experiment
was divided into three sub-experiments: the ¯rst two for eliciting respectively inequality aversion
and risk aversion, and the third to implement the social dilemma game. At the beginning of each
sub-experiment, a paper version of the instructions was distributed. After a silent reading of
the instructions by the participants, an experimenter read them aloud. Participants then had to
answer a short questionnaire in order to check their understanding. Subjects' answers were cen-
tralised in real time on the server computer, and in case of mistake(s) an experimenter proposed
an individual and discreet explanation. An important feature of our design was that subjects
were not informed about the outcomes of the ¯rst two sub-experiments { and consequently
their e®ective earnings { before playing the social dilemma game. Our objective was to not af-
fect the subjects' initial intentions to cooperate in this game, avoiding to provide information on
behaviour of the others. On average, a session lasted 90 minutes including instructions, question-
naires and payment. Subjects were paid according to the total number of Experimental Currency
Units (ECUs) earned during the experiment. The conversion rate of each sub-experiment was
given in the instructions. The average payment by subject was about 25 euros.
4.1. Aversion pro¯le elicitation
The ¯rst sub-experiment was devoted to the elicitation of inequality aversion. As rightly men-
tioned by Kroll & Davidovitz (2003), 6 most empirical studies which investigate inequality aver-
sion do not control the risk dimension. Nevertheless, an inequality reduction diminishes the risk
for future periods, particularly to new entrants in the society. For example if an individual has
to compare two income distributions with the same mean but one with a lower variance, the
choice of the last distribution may capture aversion to inequality and/or aversion to risk. With
the objective to keep the risk constant in the elicitation of inequality aversion, we followed the
procedure proposed by these authors. Subjects were individually faced with a distribution, 7
composed by three possible earnings with equal probability: x = (20;40;60). Each subject had
to vote for one of the following alternatives:
Game 1 (Common Game CG) All subjects sample the same earnings from one mutual gam-
ble.
Game 2 (Individual Game IG) Each subject independently draws her own earnings.
Immediately, we observe that the risk is exactly the same in both games: the subject had a
one-third chance to obtain one of the three earnings. But the ¯rst game resulted in a perfect
6 See also Davidovitz & Kroll (2004).
7 The conversion rate was 1 ECU = 0.1 euros.
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equality whereas the second presented an ex ante high probability of inequality. Consequently
a subject who preferred the common game CG was considered as inequality averse. The game
chosen by the majority applied to all participants. If votes were equally shared between games
CG and IG, subjects were informed that the winning distribution would be randomly drawn by
the server computer.
In the second sub-experiment we transposed the preceding procedure to elicit risk aversion,
now controlling for inequality. Subjects were faced with the same earnings distribution x =
(20;40;60), but the vote was between:
Game 3 (Safety Game SG) All subjects obtain the expected earnings, namely 40 ECUs.
Game 4 (Risky Game RG) All subjects sample the same earnings from one mutual gamble.
In both games there was perfect equality, since all subjects obtained the same earnings. But
there was a risk in the game RG, which was not the case in the game SG. Thus a subject who
preferred the game SG was considered as risk averse. Symmetrically, the distribution chosen by
the majority applied to all participants, with a random drawn in the case of perfect equality
between SG and RG. We note that the risky option entailed a risk borne by all subjects. Thus
the subject's strategy provided information on her preferences over social { and not individual
{ risk. As we have stressed in section 2, a cooperative behaviour in the social dilemma game
implies a simultaneous reduction of inequality and social risk. Thus, aversion to social risk is
clearly what we want to evaluate here.
The attractiveness of the elicitation procedure chosen in this experiment is to give priority
to simplicity { avoiding any bias due to misunderstanding such as indecision and error { with
a clear distinction between (social) risk aversion and inequality aversion. But this approach
is evidently questionable. First, in each dimension, a subject is binary classi¯ed as averse or
non-averse. A standard approach consists in evaluating precisely the degree of aversion, sup-
posing that the subject's preferences can be approximated by a particular preference functional
such the expected utility model (well-known examples are Holt & Laury (2002) in risk theory
and Amiel et al. (1999) in inequality measurement). An important issue deals with the inter-
pretation of this functional: what is the real meaning of the concavity of the utility function?
Unfortunately this concavity may capture di®erent features of the preferences { with possible
confusions between them { which may depart form risk and inequality aversions. Moreover there
is no evidence that a distinction between aversion to risk and aversion to inequality is possible
in such a framework. 8 Keeping in mind that our objective is to group subjects with similar risk
and inequality aversions, a binary classi¯cation is interesting to restrict the number of pro¯les,
under the condition that the preferences are correctly revealed. Second, aversion is captured
from only one question. We specify that particular attention in the protocol was paid to ensur-
ing and controlling the comprehension of the subjects. For each of the three sub-experiments,
a comprehension questionnaire was proposed before the decisions. At the end of each of them,
subjects had to justify by a written comment their choices and strategies. Inspection of these
data revealed no comprehension di±culties.
4.2. Social dilemma implementation
The two ¯rst sub-experiments enabled us to separate subjects according two their aversion pro-
¯les. Four types were observed: subjects inequality and risk-averse, subjects averse in only one
8 See Gajdos (2001) for a discussion.
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dimension and ¯nally subjects prone in both dimensions. Subjects with the same pro¯le were
then randomly grouped by three, following a partner matching protocol: groups were ¯xed for
the whole game. The last subjects not a®ected to a group { because in number less than three
with the same pro¯le { were randomly grouped by three in groups called mixed. The subject
was not informed that the members of her group had the same pro¯le: instructions stated that
groups were randomly constituted. Since each session consisted of 18 subjects, 6 groups were
formed per session. In the following, we denote the di®erent types of group { apart from mixed
groups { as (A,A), (A,P), (P,A) and (P,P) with A for Averse and P for Prone, the ¯rst letter of
the pair devoted to inequality. 9
We parameterised the game in the simplest fashion. The game was repeated 20 periods and,
at each period, the subject had to vote for one of the following distributions:
xc = (60;60;60) or xd = (10;70;70):
The winning distribution was chosen by majority vote. Before the vote, each member of the
group was randomly a®ected to one of the three possible ranks, namely A, B or C. Subjects were
informed that their potential payo® was correlated to their own rank: 60 or 10 ECUs for rank
A, 60 or 70 for rank B and 60 or 70 for rank C. 10 A screenshot is presented in Appendix A.5
(Figure 4). We note that (i) earnings were more equally distributed in the cooperative distri-
bution xc and (ii) the mean earnings were higher: ¹(xc) = 60 ¸ 50 = ¹(xd). Nevertheless two
subjects out of three have a personal interest to vote for the defective distribution xd. Thus
we implemented a social dilemma situation, with xc B xd. At the beginning of each period, a
redeployment of the ranks was randomly drawn. Consequently a subject in position B or C in
one period may cooperate, expecting a kind of reciprocity if in a future period she falls to rank A.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the majority vote in their group, their
payo® for the period and their cumulative payo® since the ¯rst period. Moreover a history of the
past periods was displayed (Figure 5 in Appendix A.5). History was available for consultation
at every moment of the game.
5. Results
In this section, experimental results are described. In a ¯rst sub-section we expose the subjects'
aversion pro¯les, and we compare the risk and inequality dimensions. The following sub-section
is devoted to a description of the cooperation in the ¯rst period of the game, and the last
sub-section focuses on the dynamics of cooperation over the 20 periods.
5.1. Risk aversion vs. inequality aversion
The ¯rst question asked in this experiment deals with the connections between risk aversion
and inequality aversion. We report in Table 1 the results of the ¯rst two sub-experiments,
in which individual aversion pro¯les are elicited. When we observe the marginal column and
row frequencies, we note that a majority of subjects exhibit risk aversion (58.33%) whereas the
tendency is inverted for inequality aversion (44.45%). This last result does not corroborate the
9 We specify that mixed groups can not be interpreted as a benchmark, because we do not control the com-
position process of these groups. Moreover in this experiment, it appears that players with pro¯le (A,A) are
predominantly represented in mixed groups.
10 The conversion rate was in this last sub-experiment 1 ECU = 0.01 euros. We specify that each period of the
game implied e®ective earnings.
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(27 subjects) (33 subjects) (60 subjects)
Averse
16.67% 27.78% 44.45%
(18 subjects) (30 subjects) (48 subjects)
P 41.67% 58.33% 100%
(45 subjects) (63 subjects) (108 subjects)
one obtained by Kroll & Davidovitz (2003) in a comparable treatment, where 54.12% of the
subjects { 8 years old children { were inequality-averse. Then, the Table shows that aversion in
one dimension does not seem to in°uence aversion in the other dimension. Distribution in each
row (resp. column) is consistent with the distribution of the marginal row (resp. column). A
Spearman correlation test con¯rms this hypothesis (½ = 0.076, p-value = 0.437):
Result 1 Inequality aversion and risk aversion are not correlated.
We also notice that no dominant pro¯le emerges, but that only few subjects are simultane-
ously inequality-averse and risk-prone (16.67%). Independence between the two kind of aversion
appears to be unsurprising, with regard to related works in the literature. Empirical results
reported by Cowell & Schokkaert (2001) suggested systematic di®erences between inequality and
risk perceptions. Brennan et al. (2008), who investigated other-regarding concerns and aversion
over social risk, led to similar observations.
In the third part of the experiment, subjects were grouped by three according to their aversion
pro¯les. Table 2 displays the distribution of the 36 groups. Note that in each session, mixed





(8 groups) (9 groups)
Averse
11.11% 25.00%
(4 groups) (9 groups)
Notes. Mixed groups represent 16.67% (6 groups).
groups were composed only if there was not a su±cient number of subjects with the same aversion
pro¯le. Pro¯le (A,P) { inequality-averse and risk-prone { was the least frequently observed, only
represented by 4 groups.
5.2. First period of the social dilemma game
Now we focus on the cooperation in the game, exclusively at the ¯rst period. Particular attention
has to be paid to the ¯rst period because no history of cooperation within the group may disturb
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the initial motivations of cooperation. 11 We can consider that, at this stage, only the subject's
intrinsic preferences can determinate her cooperation decision. The context is modi¯ed at the
end of this period because the majority vote is publicly announced in the group. Thus, other
dimensions such as frustration or reciprocity may a®ect the motivations of cooperation in the
rest of the game.
Average cooperation levels, according to the groups' aversion pro¯les, are presented in Table 3.
A distinction is made for the majority vote in each group, for the vote of subjects in rank A and
the vote of subjects in rank B & C. In groups where subjects are averse in both dimensions, more
Table 3: Average cooperation rates for the ¯rst period
Pro¯le Majority vote Rank A Ranks B & C
(A, A) 77.78% 100.00% 55.56%
(A, P) 50.00% 75.00% 37.50%
(P, A) 66.67% 100.00% 33.33%
(P, P) 50.00% 100.00% 43.75%
Mixed 66.67% 100.00% 41.67%
Average 62.22% 95.00% 42.36%
Â
2(4) 9.326 5.263 6.649
p-value 0.053 0.261 0.156
Notes. For example, (A,P) signi¯es inequality-averse and risk-prone.
than three-quarters of the majority votes are in favor of the cooperative distribution. This is
signi¯cantly more than groups where subjects are risk-prone ((A, A) vs. (A, P) and (A, A) vs.(P,
P), Â2 p-value = 0.014 in both cases), but not signi¯cantly di®erent compared to the pro¯le (P,
A) where two-thirds of the majority votes lead to cooperation (Â2 p-value = 0.355). Between
the pro¯le (P, A) and pro¯les (A, P) and (P, P), the average cooperation rate does not di®er
signi¯cantly (Â2 p-value = 0.123), even if the cooperative distribution is chosen only by half of
the groups (A, P) and (P, P). Now a distinction by the subject's rank is informative. Whereas
there is no objective reason to defect for subjects in rank A, 12 cooperation is costly for subjects
ranked B or C. Unsurprisingly the highest cooperation rate is observed for groups averse in both
dimensions, up to 55%. This is signi¯cantly more than for groups (A, P) and (P, A) (Â2 p-value
= 0.061 and 0.018 respectively), but not signi¯cantly higher than the cooperation observed in
pro¯le (P, P) (Â2 p-value = 0.236). As for the majority vote, the average cooperation rate does
not di®er signi¯cantly between the pro¯le (P, P) and pro¯les (A, P) and (P, A) (Â2 p-value =
0.488 and 0.235 respectively). A brief overview of these preliminary results shows that aversion
in both dimensions leads to the highest cooperation.
In order to corroborate the impact of risk and inequality aversions on cooperation at the ¯rst
period, we estimate the following binary probit speci¯cation (i = 1;:::;N):
P(qi = 1jwi) = ©(w0
iµ); (5)
where © is the cumulative standard normal distribution and qi denotes the observed choice of
player i (qi = 0 if i chooses xd, qi = 1 if i chooses xc). Variables included in the vector wi are
11 We also recall that the subjects were not informed about the outcomes of the ¯rst two sub-experiments before
playing the social dilemma game. So before playing the ¯rst period, a subject had never observed the behaviours
of her partners.
12 Cooperation rates in rank A are closed to 100%. We note that 4 groups (A,P) are observed, thus only one
subject over the 36 ranked A did not cooperate.
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the position of player i in the game (=0 if her rank is A, =1 if B or C) and dummies for her
inequality aversion and risk aversion (=0 if prone, =1 if averse). The model does not contain the
intercept as we assume that individual behaviour is well balanced, i.e. probabilities of choosing
xc and xd are equal to 0.5 when individual characteristics are absent.13
Estimation results of the probit speci¯cation are reported in Table 4.14 We observe that all
explanatory variables are signi¯cant at the 5% level. It is useful to interpret the results in terms
of marginal e®ects on the probability of cooperation P(qi = 1jwi).15 All computed marginal
e®ects are also statistically signi¯cant, with the expected sign. Change in position of player i,
Table 4: Probit estimation for the ¯rst period
Coefficient Marginal effect











Number of observations 108
Notes. ¤¤ indicates signi¯cant values at the 5% level.
from position A to B or C, has a negative e®ect on the probability of cooperation (up to 30%).
This observation seems natural since cooperation is costly for the subject when she is ranked B or
C. But surprisingly, we observe that marginal e®ects of aversion variables are comparable (23%).
This result clearly highlights the impact of both inequality and risk aversions on the probability
of cooperation. Finally, the e®ects of inequality and risk aversions are very close (about 0.58).
The equality between these coe±cients is not rejected by a Wald test (Â2(1) statistic = 0.00 and
p-value = 0.99).
Result 2 Inequality aversion and risk aversion have a signi¯cant impact on cooperation.
The above analysis underlines the role of inequality and risk aversions in the cooperation
decision of subjects, in the ¯rst period of the social dilemma game. Moreover, inequality-prone
and risk-averse (P,A) groups seem to be more cooperative than inequality-averse and risk-prone
(A,P) groups { even if di®erences of cooperation appear not to be signi¯cant. This observation
will be corroborated by the study of the whole game.
5.3. Dynamics of the social dilemma game
We start by a description of the evolution of choice for the cooperative distribution xc, as depicted
in Figure 2. Again we distinguish the majority vote, the vote of subjects in rank A and the vote
of subjects in ranks B & C. Unsurprisingly subjects in rank A select almost all the time the
cooperative distribution. For the majority vote the average cooperation is around 50%, with a
decrease over time. This decrease is signi¯cant if we compare the average in the ¯rst ten periods
13 When µ = 0, we get P(qi = 1jwi) = P(qi = 0jwi) = ©(0) = 0:5.
14 Results remain similar for the logit speci¯cation, in particular the signs of coe±cients.
15 The marginal e®ect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change of the probability of cooperation
when the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the average cooperation rate






























Majority Rank A Ranks B & C
to the average in the last ten periods (Wilcoxon one-sided p-value = < 0.001). For ranks B &
C the average cooperation is around 40% with also a signi¯cant decrease between periods 1-10
and periods 11-20 (Wilcoxon one-sided p-value = 0.015).
Result 3 Average cooperation rate is decreasing over the time.
Such cooperation evolution is a classical result for repeated social dilemma games (see Ledyard
1995). We also graphically observe a low variability of the cooperation around the decreasing
linear trend.
The evolution of the cooperation rates reveals more interesting features if we split groups by
aversion pro¯les, as presented by Figure 3 in Appendix A.5. Whatever the pro¯le, there is a
signi¯cant decrease in cooperation for the majority vote between periods 1-10 and periods 11-
20. 16 This decrease seems to be stronger for pro¯les where subjects are averse in one dimension
and prone in the other (namely (A, P) and (P, A)), especially after the tenth period. For pro¯le
(P,A) the average cooperation concerning the majority vote falls from 66.67% to 33.33% and for
pro¯le (A,P) it falls from 50% to 0%. In the pro¯les (A,A) and (P,P), the average cooperation
falls respectively from 77.78% to 44.44% and from 50% to 37.5%. This pattern applies also to
ranks B & C: the decrease between the two phases is signi¯cant for all pro¯les, except for the
pro¯le (P,P). 17 Another interesting feature of the evolution is related to the variability. In groups
where the subjects' pro¯les are either (A, A) or (P, P) the variance of decisions is signi¯cantly
lower compared to groups where the subjects' pro¯les are either (A, P) or (P, A). This holds
true both for the majority vote and for ranks B & C. 18 To sum up, we observe that:
Result 4 Aversion or non-aversion in both dimensions leads to:
16 Wicoxon one-sided, (A, A) p-value = 0.007, (A, P) p-value = 0.013, (P, A) p-value < 0.001 and (P, P) p-value
= 0.033
17 Wilcoxon one-sided, (A, A) p-value = 0.039, (A, P) p-value = 0.025, (P, A) p-value = 0.019 and (P, P) p-value
= 0.239
18 Majority vote: (A, A) vs (A, P) p-value < 0.001, (A, A) vs (P, A) p-value = 0.070, (P, P) vs (A, P) p-value <
0.001, (P, P) vs (P, A) p-value = 0.098 whereas (A, A) vs (P, P) p-value = 0.424. Ranks B & C: (A, A) vs (A,
P) p-value < 0.001, (A, A) vs (P, A) p-value = 0.011, (P, P) vs (A, P) p-value = 0.005, (P, P) vs (P, A) p-value
= 0.057 whereas (A, A) vs (P, P) p-value = 0.230.
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(i) a lower decrease in the cooperation,
(ii) a lower variability of the cooperation around the decreasing trend.
Since cooperation in one period highly in°uences cooperation in future periods, it seems natural
that decrease and variability are correlated. It clearly appears that non-aversion in one dimension
generates a noise which leads to an unstable cooperation.
Table 5 reports the average cooperation by aversion pro¯le over the 20 periods for the majority
vote, the vote of subjects in rank A and the vote of subjects in rank B & C. Almost two-thirds of
Table 5: Average cooperation rates over the 20 periods
Pro¯le Majority vote Rank A Ranks B & C
(A, A) 61.11% 97.22% 48.33%
(A, P) 28.75% 97.50% 17.50%
(P, A) 55.56% 100.00% 34.72%
(P, P) 50.63% 95.00% 38.75%
Mixed 55.00% 100.00% 38.33%
Average 50.21% 97.94% 35.53%
Â
2(4) 12.569 0.182 14.296
p-value 0.014 0.996 0.006
Notes. For example, (A,P) signi¯es inequality-averse and risk-prone.
majority votes in the pro¯le (A,A) are in favor of the cooperative distribution. This is signi¯cantly
more than in the two pro¯les where subjects are risk-prone (Mann Whitney one-sided 19 (A, A)
vs. (A, P) p-value < 0.001 and (A, A) vs. (P, P) p-value < 0.001), but not signi¯cantly di®erent
from the last pro¯le where subjects are risk-averse (MW, (A, A) vs. (P, A) p-value = 0.164).
Pro¯le (P,A) cooperates also signi¯cantly more than both risk-prone pro¯les (MW, (P, A) vs.
(A, P) p-value < 0.001 and (P, A) vs. (P, P) p-value = 0.060). Most of these observations also
hold for the average cooperation rates in ranks B & C, except that the rate in pro¯le (A, A) is
now signi¯cantly higher than in pro¯le (P, A) (MW p-value < 0.001).
Before interpreting these results we complete the analysis by the estimation of a probit model,
which seems appropriate to our panel data framework. For i = 1;:::;N and t = 2;:::;T, we have:
P(qit = 1jqi1;:::;qi;t¡1;wit;ci) = ©(½qi;t¡1 + w0
itµ + ci); (6)
where ci, i = 1;:::;N, represent individual random e®ects.20 As in the analysis for the ¯rst
period, we think that the current position of player i may a®ect her current choice. Moreover, as
player i observes past decisions of the group to which she belongs, we also think that the majority
decision at the previous period of her group may have an impact on her current choice. We can
also analyse the persistent behaviour in the decision process by including past value of individual
choice qi;t¡1. The set of explanatory variables contains then the ¯rst lag of the dependent variable
qi;t¡1 and time-variant covariates wit (including position of player i at period t, majority choice
of the player i's group at period t ¡ 1, and a time trend).
Model (6) constitutes a dynamic probit model with random e®ects of which Wooldridge (2005)
proposed a simple estimation method, by specifying an additional assumption on the distribution
19 Thereafter MW.
20 As it is recognised in econometric textbooks, it is cumbersome to consider probit model with ¯xed e®ects.
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of individual e®ects. The latter can be written in terms of our variables as follows (i = 1;:::;N):
ci = ®1qi1 + z0
i®2 + ³i; ³i » N(0;¾2
³): (7)
The distribution of individual e®ects is then related to the initial observation qi1 and the set of
time-invariant covariates zi (which includes player i's inequality and risk aversions).21 Following
Wooldridge (2005), by substituting (7) in (6), we obtain the following equation (i = 1;:::;N;
t = 2;:::;T):
P(qit = 1jqi1;:::;qi;t¡1;wit;ci) = ©(½qi;t¡1 + w0
itµ + ®1qi1 + z0
i®2 + ³i); (8)
which corresponds to the usual random e®ect probit model where ³i now represents the standard
individual random e®ect and the new set of explanatory variables corresponds to qi;t¡1, wit, qi1,
zi.
Estimation results of the model are reported in Table 6. The random e®ect model is not
rejected by the speci¯cation likelihood-ratio test. We can be therefore con¯dent about inter-
pretations drawn from this model. As in the previous analysis, the player's position negatively
Table 6: Dynamic probit estimation for the whole game
Coefficient Marginal effect
























Number of individuals 108
Number of periods 19
Number of observations 2052
LR test for random e®ects 282.36
¤¤
Notes. ¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi¯cant values at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
in°uences the probability of cooperation. Moreover, the signs of position, inequality aversion
and risk aversion remain unchanged compared to results obtained only for the ¯rst period of the
game. The marginal e®ect of inequality aversion on the cooperation probability is lower than
that of risk aversion. We perform the Wald test proposed by Kodde & Palm (1986) for the strict
inequality between the two coe±cients (i.e. H0: ®
ineq.
2 < ®risk
2 ). The test statistic is equal to 0.00,
implying that we do not reject the null at the 5% level.22 If one connects these estimation results
with the initial descriptive statistics, one may argue that risk aversion impacts signi¯catively
more the dynamic of cooperation than inequality aversion.
21 We do not use any time-invariant covariate in wit in equation (6) as their coe±cients cannot be identi¯ed with
those of zi in (7). It should be noted that dummies of sessions, periods, and groups are not included in our
model because they create a multicolinearity problem.
22 Kodde & Palm (1986) provided the upper and lower bounds for the test. The null hypothesis is rejected if the
computed statistic exceeds the upper bound value, and is not rejected if the statistic is smaller than the lower
bound value. The test is inconclusive for values in between the two bounds. In our case, the lower and upper
bounds (the degree of freedom of our test is 1) at the 5% level coincide and are equal to 2.706.
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Concerning additional variables (with respect to the ¯rst-period analysis), we ¯nd that past
individual decision positively in°uences the probability of current cooperation. The choice of
group majority at the previous period and the initial individual choice (or choice at the ¯rst
period) have positive e®ects on the cooperation probability. Finally, the cooperation slowly
diminishes during the game as the marginal e®ect of the time trend is statistically negative but
small (its marginal e®ect is -0.009). This last observation con¯rms previous results dealing with
the decreasing trend of the cooperation. Thus, the main results of our experimental study are
summarised by:
Result 5 Aversion pro¯le has an impact on cooperation:
(i) Aversion in both dimensions leads to the highest average cooperation rate.
(ii) Aversion in only one dimension is not su±cient to ensure cooperation.
(iii) Risk aversion has a greater impact than inequality aversion on the dynamics of cooperation.
The ¯rst point (i) is in line with initial intuition. The game is orientated in such a way that
aversion might encourage cooperation, which is corroborated by the experiment. But other in-
formation emerges. First we observe that non-aversion in one-dimension leads to a decrease
in cooperation. But surprisingly, inequality aversion does not seem to maintain cooperation.
Whereas the decrease is not signi¯cant from (A,A) to (P,A), the cooperation falls dramatically
from (A,A) to (A,P). Second, cooperation for groups (P,P) is relatively higher. On average,
this aversion pro¯le cooperates more than pro¯le (A,P). It is important to recall that the ex-
pected payment of the cooperative distribution is higher than the defective one. Then a perfect
maximizer subject might be inclined to choose cooperation, without social motivations or risk
considerations. So there is nothing irrational in obtaining a relatively high level of cooperation
for groups (P,P). The cooperation level for groups (A,P) is however really surprising. Many
factors can cause such an evolution. Particularly, one does not confuse inequality aversion and
altruism. Whereas an altruistic individual is not satis¯ed if poor people exists, an individual
averse to inequality will su®er if some people are better treated than him, without objective
reasons. 23 Thus, if in one period an individual in position A remarks that other members of her
group do not cooperate, a frustration felling will probably corrupt her cooperative intentions in
the future. Even more, she will want to punish them. Such a behaviour is in line with theories
of impure or conditional altruism, for example the one developed by Rabin (1993). Since non
aversion in one dimension leads to higher variability in cooperation (result 4), combination of
such feelings may rapidly damage the social harmony and, as a consequence, cooperation.
6. Overview and discussion
In this paper, we have proposed and tested experimentally a game where social cooperation
may be encouraged, simultaneously by inequality and risk aversion. Such situations are widely
observed in any human society, as soon as social cooperation for a reduction of inequality today
leads to a diminution of potential social risk in the future. A really evocative example is cap-
tured by mutual bene¯t societies, where the aim of cooperation is to provide a mutual insurance
coverage following a solidarity rule. Our social dilemma game describes a situation where indi-
viduals are ex ante unequal in social statuses. Social statuses include all the factors justifying
di®erences in income such as for example health, intelligence, ¯nancial inheritance or country
23 See Fehr & Schmidt (1999) for a distinction between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.
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of birth. Individuals can then cooperate to establish a redistributive scheme. This scheme is
costly for a majority of people, but socially e±cient in the sense that earnings would be more
equally distributed and total earnings greater. The ¯nal decision is obtained by a vote, so that
redistribution becomes e®ective if a majority acts in this way. But statuses are not ¯xed over
time, or in other words advantageous positions are not guarantee in the future. Consequently,
inequality averse and/or risk averse individuals may be inclined to cooperate. A ¯nite number
of periods is repeated to duplicate the social dilemma situation, with at each period a random
redeployment of social statuses and the perspective to become richer or poorer.
Before participating in the 20 periods repeated game, the aversion pro¯le of each subject is
elicited. Inequality aversion is obtained using the procedure proposed by Kroll & Davidovitz
(2003), which we have transposed for risk aversion. Our objective is to clearly distinguish the
two dimensions, taking care to avoid possible confusions. For inequality elicitation risk is kept
constant, and vice versa. Related works in the literature tend to demonstrate that perceptions
on inequality and perceptions on risk display signi¯cant di®erences. The experiment proposed
here corroborates these views: we observe that aversions are not correlated. Whereas a majority
of subjects exhibit aversion to risk, slightly more than 50% are not inequality averse. Moreover,
no dominant pro¯le emerges. Subjects combining inequality aversion with non aversion in social
risks are less represented, in comparison with other pro¯les represented in relatively comparable
proportions.
Cooperation in the game is then analysed. We recall that subjects are grouped by three
according to their aversion pro¯les. The average cooperation rate, over the 20 periods and for
all the groups, is around 50%. The dynamics of cooperation is in line with standard results in
the experimental literature on repeated social dilemma games, with a slightly decreasing trend.
But evolution and level of cooperation are signi¯catively in°uenced by the group's aversion
pro¯le. First, aversion or non-aversion in both dimensions leads to a lower decrease and a weaker
variability over time. Thus non-aversion in only one dimension seems to create a noise which
makes cooperation unstable. Then, in line with our initial intuition, aversion in both dimensions
leads to the highest average cooperation rate. Groups averse in only one dimension are less
cooperative. Nevertheless consequences are not symmetrically related. Whereas cooperation
of non-inequality-averse but risk-averse groups is not signi¯catively di®erent from averse/averse
groups, cooperation of non-risk-averse but inequality-averse groups falls dramatically to zero at
the last periods. Cooperation for non-averse/non-averse groups is signi¯catively lower than the
¯rst two groups, but not to the third.
In a situation where an inequality reduction implies a decrease in social risks, our experimental
results suggest that aversion pro¯le has a signi¯cant e®ect on the outcome and the robustness
of cooperation. Moreover, it appears that the main driving-force which supports cooperation
seems to be risk aversion. Individuals are aware that advantageous positions may be reversed in
the future, so they act today to improve the situation of individuals treated less favorably than
them. This observation must however be exploited cautiously. An over-interpretation might
be to consider that inequality aversion plays a marginal role, so that any cooperative act in
order to reduce inequality constitutes a kind of self-insurance. Inequality aversion is in fact a
really complex cognitive process which depends on the environment. Initially such an aversion
may encourage fairness attitudes, such as cooperation in our game. But if inequality averse
individuals are not satis¯ed with the existence of underprivileged persons, they will also not be
pleased if persons better treated than them do not act to improve their own situation. That
is, if they notice a cooperation failure when they are underprivileged themselves, a desire for
punishment might rule their behaviour in the future. In our opinion, the main conclusion of this
paper is twofold. First, it seems imperative to take into account the risk dimension to clearly
understand the social motivations to reduce inequality. Second, whereas inequality aversion
18Magdalou, Dubois, Nguyen-Van / Risk and Inequality Aversion in Social Dilemmas
may favor social cooperation, the existence of \free riders" may damage dramatically the initial
cooperative motivations, leading to a punishment behaviour costly for the whole society.
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A. Appendix
A.1. General instructions
(translated from the french) You are going to participate in an experiment designed for studying
decision process. We ask you to read carefully the whole instructions. These instructions are
simple and should help you to understand the experiment. When all participants have read these
instructions an experimenter will read it again.
Decisions you will take are anonymously collected by the computer-network.
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Your earnings will depend on your own decisions as well as on the decisions taken by the other
participants. The monetary unit used in the experiment is the ecu. The conversion rate of the
ecus into euros will be speci¯ed at the end of these instructions. The total amount of ecus
earned during the experiment will be given to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The experiment does not contain \good" or \bad" decisions. Every decision may have its own
justi¯cation.
We ask you not to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. It is a
necessary condition for the success of the experiment.
A.2. Instructions dealing with the elicitation of inequality aversion
(translated from the french) We are going to describe two games you may participate in. You
will have to vote for one of them. Every participant in this room will face the same vote. Only
the game having obtained the majority of votes will apply. If there is a perfect equality between
the votes for both games, a random draw made by the central computer will determine the game
that will apply.
The two games :
Game #
In this game every participant can receive one of the three following earnings: 20 ecus, 40
ecus or 60 ecus. The central computer makes one random draw for each participant in
this room. Thus each participant receives her own earnings with respect to the random drawn
applying to her.
Game x
In this game each participant can receive one of the three following earnings: 20 ecus, 40
ecus or 60 ecus. The central computer makes only one random draw applying for every
participant. Thus each participant receives the same earnings with respect to the unique
random draw applying to everyone.
The conversion rate is as follow: 10 ecus = 1 euro.
Before the start of the experiment you will have to complete a short questionnaire, in order
to check your understanding of the instructions. When every participant has completed the
questionnaire, you will have to vote.
A.3. Instructions dealing with the elicitation of risk aversion
(translated from the french) We are going to describe two games you may participate in. You
will have to vote for one of them. Every participant in this room will face the same vote. Only
the game having obtained the majority of votes will apply. If there is a perfect equality between
the votes for both games, a random draw made by the central computer will determine the game
that will apply.
The two games :
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Game #
In this game every participant receive 40 ecus.
Game x
In this game each participant can receive one of the three following earnings: 20 ecus, 40
ecus or 60 ecus. The central computer makes only one random draw applying for every
participant. Thus each participant receives the same earnings.
The conversion rate is as follow: 10 ecus = 1 euro.
Before the start of the experiment you will have to complete a short questionnaire in order
to check your understanding of the instructions. When every participant has completed the
questionnaire, you will have to vote.
A.4. Instructions dealing with the social dilemma game
(translated from the french) In this experiment all the participants in the room are divided into
groups of three. Groups are formed randomly, and will stay ¯xed for the whole experiment. You
can not identify the other members of your group, and the other members of your group can not
identify you.
This experiment consists into a repetition of 20 periods. At each period, you will have to vote for
one of two earnings distributions. These distributions will remain the same for all the periods.
In each period the distribution having the majority vote in your group will apply for the period,
and for your group.
At the start of each period a random draw will place each of the three group members in one
of the three following position: A, B or C. You will be informed of your position for the period
before your vote. Figure 4 is an example of the decision screen.
After the vote of each member of your group, a summary of the period will be displayed, with
the following information: your position for the period, your vote, the majority vote in your
group and your earnings for the period. Also, you will have information about the past periods.
You can consult this history at any moment by clicking on the button \history". Figure 5 is an
example of the history screen.
The two earnings distributions:
Distribution #
In this distribution, earnings with respect to the position in the group are the following:
Position A B C
Gain (ecus) 10 70 70
Distribution x
In this distribution, earnings with respect to the position in the group are the following:
Position A B C
Gain (ecus) 60 60 60
The conversion rate is the following: 100 ecus = 1 euro.
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Before the start of the experiment you will have to complete a short questionnaire, in order
to check your understanding of the instructions. When every participant has completed the
questionnaire, the ¯rst period will begin.
A.5. Figures
Figure 3: Evolution of the average cooperation rate by aversion pro¯le
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Majority Rank A Ranks B & C
Notes. For example, (A,P) signi¯es inequality-averse and risk-prone.
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Figure 4: Screenshot of decision in the game
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Figure 5: Screenshot of history
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